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Abstract The present research investigates the relationship between anxiety and the
religiosity dimensions that Wulff (Psychology of religion: classic and contemporary views,
Wiley, New York, 1991; Psychology of religion. Classic and contemporary views, Wiley,
New York, 1997; Psychologia religii. Klasyczna i wspo ´łczesna, Wydawnictwo Szkolne i
Pedagogiczne, Warszawa, 1999) described as Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence
and Literal vs. Symbolic. The researchers used the Post-Critical Belief scale (Hutsebaut in
J Empir Theol 9(2):48–66, 1996; J Empir Theol 10(1):39–54, 1997) to measure Wulff’s
religiosity dimensions and the IPAT scale (Krug et al. 1967) to measure anxiety. Results
from an adult sample (N = 83) suggest that three dimensions show signiﬁcant relations
with anxiety. Orthodoxy correlated negatively with suspiciousness (L) and positively with
guilt proneness (O) factor—in the whole sample. Among women, Historical Relativism
negatively correlated with suspiciousness (L), lack of integration (Q3), general anxiety and
covert anxiety. Among men, Historical Relativism positively correlated with tension (Q4)
and emotional instability (C), general anxiety, covert anxiety and overt anxiety. External
Critique was correlated with suspiciousness (L) by men.
Keywords Post-Critical Belief  Religion  Religiosity  Religious belief 
Anxiety
Introduction
The aim of the present study was to explore whether the way in which people approach
religion is related to anxiety and if so, how these two notions are related to each other.
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DOI 10.1007/s10943-010-9367-2The relationship between religiosity and anxiety is a relatively common topic in the
literature of the psychology of religion—in particular, regarding the function of religiosity
in personality (Shreve-Neiger and Edelstein 2004). In the existing overview of the
empirical research pertaining to the relationship between religiosity and psychic health
(Gartner et al. 1991) and between religiosity and anxiety (Shreve-Neiger and Edelstein
2004), we paid special attention to the inconsistency of the results that various researchers
obtained (Loewenthal 2006). Some studies provide evidence for the supposition that there
is no correlation between religiosity and anxiety (Fehr and Heintzelman 1977; Frenz and
Carey 1989; Francis and Jackson 2003; Huntley and Peeters 2005). Other studies show that
there are signiﬁcant correlations. Researchers observed a positive correlation between
anxiety and external religiosity and a negative correlation between anxiety and internal
religiosity (Sturgeon and Hamley 1979; Baker and Gorsuch 1982; Bergin et al. 1987; Davis
et al. 2003). They also conﬁrmed a negative correlation between anxiety and the ability to
express religious needs (Maltby 1998) and a positive correlation with religious crisis
(Pfeifer and Waelty 1999). Wilson and Miller (1968) found that individuals who undertake
religious practices are characterized by a higher level of anxiety. Gupta (1983) showed that
a higher level of anxiety characterizes individuals with high orthodox religiosity. S ´liwak
(2006) conﬁrmed correlations of anxiety with the types of relation to God measured with
the Hutsebaut (1980) scale of Relationship to God: Anxiety correlated positively with
rebelliousness toward God and with guilt and negatively with identiﬁcation with Christ and
co-humaneness. Pre ˛_ zyna (1969) conﬁrmed a negative correlation of the intensity of reli-
gious attitude with anxiety among men. Moreover, an interesting trend of studies on
religiosity and fear of death has emerged. In this respect, the results also turned out to be
diverse. For instance, Rasmussen and Johnson (1994) conﬁrmed that fear of death is not
related to religiosity, but Westman and Brackney (1990) found negative correlations
between fear of death and religiosity (see also Roff et al. 2002;S ´liwak 2005).
In their critical review of the literature regarding correlations between religiosity and
anxiety, Shreve-Neiger and Edelstein (2004) suggested that deﬁning both variables as
uniform constructs may be the reason for discrepancies observed in study results. They
recommended applying deﬁnitions that would encompass particular dimensions of religi-
osity and typological and structural elements of anxiety (see also Baker and Gorsuch 1982;
Harris et al. 2002).
Following this recommendation, we decided to rely on the theoretical framework of
Wulff (1991, 1997) and investigated the relationship between anxiety and Wulff’s ((1991,
1997)) approach to religion. First, we will summarize Wulff’s theory and introduce the
Post-Critical Belief scale.
David Wulff (1991, 1997, 1999) suggested a new and interesting perspective on religion
in a secularized socio-cultural context. In the epilogue of his inﬂuential book, Wulff (1991,
1997, 1999) argued that the various possible approaches to religion can be positioned in a
two-dimensional space (see Fig. 1). The vertical axis in this space speciﬁes the degree to
which the objects of religious interest are granted participation in a transcendent reality
(Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence). The horizontal axis indicates whether religion
is interpreted literally or symbolically (Literal vs. Symbolic). Hence, these two dimensions
deﬁne four quadrants, each reﬂecting a potential approach to religion: Literal Afﬁrmation,
Literal Disafﬁrmation, Reductive Interpretation and Restorative Interpretation (see Fig. 1;
Hutsebaut 1996).
The upper left quadrant, Literal Afﬁrmation, represents a position most clearly
embodied by religious fundamentalism. However, elements of this posture also appear
among individuals who are not particularly conservative. According to Wulff (1991, 1997,
420 J Relig Health (2012) 51:419–430
1231999), this position, which is partly reﬂected in scales like Barron (1963) Fundamentalist
Belief scale, can only be sustained by accepting the validity of the conservative view.
Therefore, it should not be surprising that literal believers tend to score higher on measures
of prejudice and lower on cognitive development and can be characterized as rigid and low
in their ability to adapt. People occupying this quadrant accept the existence of the reli-
gious realm as well as religious doctrines, but they interpret them literally.
The lower left quadrant, Literal Disafﬁrmation, represents a position in which the
individuals reject the existence of the religious realm. Moreover, the possibility that the
religious language has a symbolic meaning is lost. Therefore, as in the upper left quadrant,
religious language is understood in a literal way. The difference lies in the fact that the
individuals who demonstrate Literal Disafﬁrmation reject what is written or said as a
religious doctrine or dogma. If anything is made absolute, it is the scientiﬁc method and
rational and formal principles of knowledge. According to Wulff (1991, 1997, 1999), this
position is partly reﬂected in the indiscriminately anti-religious orientation identiﬁed by
Allport and Ross (1967) as well as in Barron (1963) Fundamentalist Disbelief scale. People
occupying this quadrant tend to be less dogmatic and more intellectual than representatives
of other religious types (see Wulff 1991, 1997, 1999).
The lower right quadrant, Reductive Interpretation, represents a position in which
individuals reject the existence of the religious realm. However, they claim a privileged
perspective on the hidden meaning of religion’s myths and rituals and allow that religion
can have symbolic functions. This quadrant is derived from the work of Ricoeur (1970),
who proposed that, in modern hermeneutics, in order to clear away from religious symbols,
the excrescence of idolatry and illusion, a Reductive Interpretation is necessary. Wulff
(1991, 1997, 1999) draws on ﬁndings obtained with scales such as Batson (1976) Quest
scale and Barron (1963) Enlightenment Disbelief scale to ﬁll out a portrait of individuals in
this quadrant. He concludes that these individuals are complex, socially sensitive and
insightful, relatively unprejudiced, and original.
Finally, the upper right quadrant, Restorative Interpretation, represents a position in
which the individuals afﬁrm the existence of the religious realm but try to encompass and
Fig. 1 Integration of the three
Post-Critical Belief subscales in
Wulff’s (1991, 1997, 1999)
theoretical model according to
Hutsebaut (1996) (see Fontaine
et al. 2003)
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123transcend all possible Reductive Interpretations in order to ﬁnd the symbolic meaning of
religious language. Again, this quadrant is derived from the work of Ricoeur (1970), who
proposed that, in modern hermeneutics, in order to make it possible for the object of
suspicion to be restored to an object of understanding and faith, a Restorative Interpretation
is necessary. In this respect, Ricoeur introduced the concept of Second Naivete ´. According
to Wulff (1991, 1997, 1999), to characterize individuals who occupy this position is quite
difﬁcult, for until recently, researchers have largely neglected this area in empirical
research. Nevertheless, Fowler (1981) shows this posture in his ﬁfth stage (conjunctive
faith) of faith development. This stage is achieved at the moment of going beyond the
deﬁned attitude to religion, characteristic for a previous stage of the individual-reﬂective
faith. This moment allows disillusionment to appear, which results from the awareness that
life is more complicated than the clear differences and abstract notions of classical thinking
propose. Research with scales designed to operationalize this stage might therefore cast
light on this position (Duriez et al., 2000, 2005; Duriez and Hutsebaut 2001).
Inspired by Wulff (1991, 1997), Hutsebaut (1996) developed the Post-Critical Belief
scale. This scale consisted originally of 24 items that captured the four approaches to
religion determined by Wulff within a secularized Christian context. Hutsebaut (1996)
carried out an initial analysis of the internal structure of the Post-Critical Belief scale in a
mixed sample of adolescents, university students and adults. However, it offered only
partial support for Hutsebaut’s contention that the Post-Critical Belief scale was a valid
measure of Wulff’s concepts. Moreover, factor analysis followed by VARIMAX rotation
pointed neither to two bipolar factors referring to the two bipolar dimensions discerned by
Wulff nor to four unipolar factors referring to Wulff’s four quadrants. Instead, three
unipolar factors emerged. Items that referred to the acceptance of Christian beliefs had a
positive loading on the ﬁrst factor. This factor could easily be interpreted in terms of what
Wulff called Literal Afﬁrmation, and Hutsebaut (1996) labeled it as Orthodoxy. Next,
items with a signiﬁcant loading on the second factor referred either to the meaningfulness
of the Christian religion or to its historical relativity. Hutsebaut (1996) described it as
consistent with what Wulff called Restorative Interpretation and labeled it as Historical
Relativism. Items aimed at measuring either what Wulff called Literal Disafﬁrmation or
Reductive Interpretation had a positive loading on the third factor. Therefore, Hutsebaut
determined that this factor measures Exclusion of Transcendence and labeled it External
Critique (see Fig. 1).
1 We adopted the terminology of our sources although important
1 In subsequent studies, Duriez et al. (2000) re-investigated the internal structure of the Post-Critical Belief
scale using multidimensional scaling (MDS). A two-dimensional MDS representation of the relationships
between the items of the PCBS could be interpreted by means of both a dimensional and a regional
interpretation. The ﬁrst dimension could be interpreted as Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence. The
second dimension could be interpreted in terms of Literal vs. Symbolic. This dimensional interpretation was
compatible with the regional interpretation. The Orthodoxy items were situated in the upper left quadrant,
the External Critique items were situated in the lower left quadrant, and most Historical Relativism items
were situated in the upper right quadrant. However, some of the Historical Relativism items were situated in
the lower right quadrant. A close inspection of the items revealed a difference in content between the items
in the upper right and the lower right quadrants. The items in the upper right quadrant clearly implied an
adherence to Christian religion, while the items in the lower right quadrant merely focused on the historical
relativity of Christian religion without implying an adherence to it. Hence, both the position and the content
of the items in the lower right quadrant indicated that these items were not suited to measure Restorative
Interpretation. Therefore, Duriez et al. (2000) decided to divide Historical Relativism into two parts. The
upper right quadrant, implying Inclusion of Transcendence, was labeled Second Naivete ´. The lower right
quadrant, referring to a purely relativist stance, was labeled Relativism (cf. Fontaine et al. 2003; Duriez and
Hutsebaut 2010).
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123philosophical questions can and should be raised about the precise intent and ultimate
appropriateness of these terms.
In subsequent studies, factor analysis conﬁrmed the existence of these three factors (see
Hutsebaut 1997; Desimpelaere et al. 1999; Duriez et al. 2000; Fontaine et al. 2003). Based
on the empirical research, Hutsebaut et al. (Duriez et al. 2000) conclude that the Post-
Critical Belief scale is a promising scale for the measurement of religious attitudes in a
secularized context, but the internal structure of the Post-Critical Belief scale does not ﬁt
Wulff’s model very well. According to Wulff (1991, 1997), the domain of religion is
characterized by two bipolar dimensions (Inclusion vs. Exclusion of Transcendence and
Literal vs. Symbolic) that give rise to four approaches to religion. Instead of two bipolar
dimensions, three unipolar factors are identiﬁed in the PCBS scale. We chose to go with
Hutsebaut’s Post-Critical Belief scale.
We measured the correlation between the three attitudes toward religion and Cattell’s
factors of anxiety. Bearing in mind that Hutsebaut’s model is relatively new, and not yet
adequately tested, and that formulating hypotheses is a rather tentative business, we,
nevertheless, tried to make at least some predictions with regard to the relationship of post-
critical beliefs with anxiety. We propose the hypothesis that a literal understanding of
religion (Orthodoxy and External Critique) should correlate positively with anxiety and
symbolic interpretation of religion (Historical Relativism) should correlate negatively with
anxiety. Hence, we expect that individuals who are situated in the Historical Relativism
group score lower on anxiety than those who are situated in the two other groups
(Orthodoxy and External Critique). Literal and symbolic interpretations are different but
equally legitimate ways to express intended meaning. They pertain to educational level and
differentiations of consciousness, e.g. the ability to switch to thinking in different ways and
to interrelate them easily (i.e. Lonergan 1972).
As neither existing research nor theoretical assumptions allowed for formulating
hypotheses, including differences in gender, we treat this part of our study as exploratory in
nature.
Method
Participants
We tested 83 individuals (46 women and 37 men) aged 25–45 (M = 31.82; SD = 7.21).
There are no statistically signiﬁcant differences in terms of age between women and men.
In the tested sample, individuals with a higher (N = 50) and secondary (N = 28) education
constitute the majority. The vast majority of subjects come from an urban environment
(N = 70).
Measures
We applied two psychological tests: Hutsebaut’s Post-Critical Belief scale and Cattell’s
IPAT Anxiety scale.
We used the Post-Critical Belief scale by D. Hutsebaut to measure attitude toward
religion. This scale consists of 24 items that are to measure Orthodoxy, External Critique
and Historical Relativism (Hutsebaut 1996, 1997, 2000; Duriez et al. 2000).
A high score on the scale of Orthodoxy means that the person claims that there is only
one true answer to religious questions and this answer is accepted by religious authorities.
J Relig Health (2012) 51:419–430 423
123A high score on the scale of External Critique suggests that the person displays a tendency
toward disbelief, yet religion plays a role in his/her life, although usually in a negative or
ambivalent way and the person questions the meaning of religious beliefs fundamentally.
Historical Relativism indicates that the person accepts the existence of God but less than
orthodox individuals do. For this person, thought and talk about faith are relative; that is,
different interpretations of religion and the changeability of its meaning in both a particular
context and a historical perspective are acceptable.
We measured these three dimensions by means of eight items each. Answers were given
on a 7-point Likert scale. The minimum possible score is eight and the maximum, 58
points. J. S ´liwak translated PCBS into Polish.
The IPAT Anxiety scale (Krug et al. 1976) was used to measure free-ﬂoating anxiety,
which is not the anxiety or fear triggered by a particular stimulus. This scale consists of
Cattell’s 16 Personality Factors (16 PF) Questionnaire (1957). Cattell chose all items
related to anxiety reactions from the 16 PF. As a result of a factor analysis, he separated 5
individual factors that constitute a Total Anxiety factor: emotional instability (C), suspi-
ciousness (L), guilt proneness (O), lack of integration (Q3) and tension (Q4). Using these
factors, he examined 3,000 individuals, calculated the discriminatory power of the items
and left 40 items with the highest diagnostic value. Half of the items are related to the
covert anxiety indicators that do not refer to anxiety. These are, for instance, sudden
changes of interests, somatic disorders (dyspepsia, cardiac arrhythmias) and feelings of
jealousy. The other half is related to the overt anxiety indicators, e.g., perceiving oneself as
a nervous person, experiencing tension and agitation and experiencing uneasy sleep
(Cattell and Schuerger 2003).
Krug et al. (1976) reported the total score test–retest reliability of the IPAT scale at
4 weeks as .82. Internal consistency reliability of the Total Anxiety score was between .78
and .92. K. Hirszel translated the IPAT Anxiety scale into Polish, and Z. Płu_ zek prepared a
psychological interpretation. High validity and reliability characterize the test (Siek 1983).
Results
We calculated Spearman’s rho coefﬁcients among the Post-Critical Belief scale and Cat-
tell’s factors of anxiety for the general sample. We calculated these coefﬁcients also for the
subgroups of women and men.
Orthodoxy correlated with two anxiety factors, positively (rho = .240) with guilt
proneness (O) and negatively (rho =- .213) with suspiciousness (L), in the general
sample (Table 1). There were no statistically signiﬁcant differences in the correlation
between Orthodoxy and anxiety in the subgroups of women and men.
A different view concerns correlations between anxiety and Historical Relativism
(Table 2). In the general sample, there were no statistically signiﬁcant correlations between
the analyzed variables. However, extremely different correlations appear in the subgroups
of women and men. Among women, Historical Relativism correlated negatively with lack
of integration (Q3; rho =- .362) and suspiciousness (L; rho =- .430), whereas among
men, it correlated positively with emotional instability (C; rho = .324), tension (Q4;
rho = .325) and overt anxiety (rho = .357). In addition, in both the subgroups, Historical
Relativism correlated with general anxiety and with covert anxiety negatively among
women (rho =- .295, rho =- .314, respectively) and positively among men (rho = .357,
rho = .376, respectively).
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among men (Table 3).
Discussion
This study examined relations among the Post-Critical Belief scale and Cattell’s factors of
trait anxiety. We concentrated on the strength and direction of particular correlations in the
general group. Furthermore, we analyzed their speciﬁcity in sex-differentiated subgroups.
We found statistically signiﬁcant correlations between the Post-Critical Belief scale and
anxiety. In the general sample, we observed correlations between Orthodoxy and two
factors of anxiety: negative regarding suspiciousness (L) and positive regarding guilt
proneness (O). We speculate that people high in Orthodoxy ﬁnd safety in religion, but
anxiety accompanies their literal understanding of religion. They experience the feeling of
guilt (Baker and Gorsuch 1982), in particular when they cannot satisfy normative religious
demands. Duriez and Hutsebaut (2001) found similar tendencies. Researchers noted that
Table 1 Correlations (rho-Spearman) of Orthodoxy with anxiety in a general sample and among women
(N = 46) and men (N = 37)
Anxiety scale (Subscales) Orthodoxy
General sample (N = 83) Women (N = 46) Men (N = 37)
General anxiety 0.098 -0.002 0.014
Q3 -0.065 -0.142 -0.019
C -0.095 -0.006 -0.197
L -0.213* -0.175 -0.277
O 0.240* 0.124 0.158
Q4 0.140 0.025 0.170
Overt anxiety 0.176 0.094 0.110
Covert anxiety -0.010 -0.083 -0.059
* P\0.05
Table 2 Correlations (rho-Spearman) of Historical Relativism with anxiety in a general sample and among
women (N = 46) and men (N = 37)
Anxiety scale (Subscales) Historical Relativism
General sample (N = 83) Women (N = 46) Men (N = 37)
General anxiety 0.037 -0.295* 0.423**
Q3 -0.094 -0.362* 0.271
C 0.078 -0.084 0.324*
L -0.101 -0.430** 0.286
O 0.052 -0.094 0.217
Q4 0.104 -0.120 0.352*
Overt anxiety 0.091 -0.161 0.357*
Covert anxiety -0.013 -0.314* 0.376*
* P\0.05; ** P\0.01
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religion. According to Duriez and Hutsebaut (2001), inclusion of transcendence is related
to associating religion with positive feelings, whereas approaching religion in a literal way
is related to associating religion with negative feelings. These results seem to conﬁrm
studies conducted by other researchers. Zarzycka (2007) and S ´liwak (2005) found positive
correlations between Orthodoxy and the centrality and intensity of religiosity, and
Hutsebaut (1996) found positive correlations between Orthodoxy and guilt proneness.
Therefore, we suppose that Orthodoxy is a source of ambivalent emotional experiences in
which trust in God is combined with elements of frustration, blame and fear.
We observed no signiﬁcant correlations between External Critique and anxiety neither
in the general sample nor in the subgroup of women. Among men, however, External
Critique correlated positively with suspiciousness (L). This outcome supports Wulff’s
speculations that people high on External Critique are distrustful and suspicious toward
religion and that, if they treat anything as absolute, it should be the scientiﬁc method and
rational principles of knowledge. Hence, our study provides empirical support for a rela-
tionship between suspiciousness (L) and External Critique. Other studies also conﬁrmed
the results. For instance, External Critique correlated negatively with religious experience
and worship (Zarzycka 2007). Hutsebaut (1996) found that this style correlated positively
with the revolt against God. Duriez and Hutsebaut (2001) observed positive correlations
between External Critique and aggression and depression, and Exline et al. (1999) found
positive relationships between atheism and anger toward God. Nevertheless, Hutsebaut
(1996), Duriez and Hutsebaut (2001) and Zarzycka (2007) derived their data from studies
carried out on groups that were not sex-differentiated. Authors conducted no analyses in
the subgroups of men and women. We cannot explain why the positive correlation between
External Critique and suspiciousness (L) is present only among men. It seems that further
research on religiosity with particular attention to gender is needed.
With regard to Historical Relativism, which corresponds to Restorative Interpretation,
we found a stronger correlation with anxiety but, interestingly enough, not in the general
sample but in the subgroups of women and men. In both women and men, Historical
Relativism correlated with general anxiety and covert anxiety, but correlations are negative
among women and positive among men. In the group of women, Historical Relativism
correlated negatively with the lack of integration (Q3) and suspiciousness (L) and in the
Table 3 Correlations (rho-Spearman) of External Critique with anxiety in a general sample and among
women (N = 46) and men (N = 37)
Anxiety scale (Subscales) External Critique
General sample (N = 83) Women (N = 46) Men (N = 37)
General anxiety 0.060 -0.057 0.236
Q3 0.066 0.006 0.220
C 0.107 -0.027 0.246
L 0.170 -0.012 0.376*
O -0.077 -0.162 0.011
Q4 0.014 -0.037 0.065
Overt anxiety 0.058 -0.110 0.226
Covert anxiety -0.052 -0.035 0.151
* P\0.05; P\0.01
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These results suggest that anxiety is related to Historical Relativism differently among men
and women. Women high in Historical Relativism have low anxiety, whereas men high in
Historical Relativism have high anxiety. These issues are difﬁcult, not easily dispatched,
disputed, and our opinion expressed is supposition and speculation, a struggling attempt to
make sense of the data.
Several authors have posited that observed differences between men and women in
religious participation are a function of socialization by which women are socialized to be
focused relationally and men are taught to value achievement and power (Simpson et al.
2008; Hall 1997; Mahalik and Lagan 2001; Reich 1997; Stokes 1990; Thompson 1991).
Other discussions regarding sex and gender differences in religiousness have focused on
the role of connected versus separate knowing (cf. Simpson et al. 2008). According to
Belenky et al. (1986), separated knowers take an impersonal stance since they rigorously
exclude personal beliefs and feelings, while connected knowers emphasize feelings and use
empathy and listening to try to understand others. Ozorak (1996) found that ‘‘women
conceptualize religion in terms of relationship rather than individuation’’ (p. 23) and noted
that women tended to prefer a relational interaction with God as opposed to a more distant
participation characterized by individuation (e.g., knowing through reason, viewing God as
a distant judge, etc.).
Other discussions refer to the concept of Kohlberg’s (1973, 1981) moral development
and its evaluation carried out by Gilligan (1982, 1988). According to Gilligan, there is a
relationship between the way people deﬁne themselves and moral reasoning. In experi-
encing his self, a man deﬁnes himself by separating himself from the rest of the world and
by stressing his special position in it, and this position is evaluated by referring to objective
rules. A woman determines herself in relation to her relationship to the world and other
people, and it is evaluated on the basis of particular acts of care and concern. This
dissimilar experiencing of self is a source of different conﬂicts and development problems.
On the one hand, men struggle with feelings and emotions when objective rules change,
and the logic of justice loses its obligatory power. Women, on the other hand, base their
reasoning on the dependency on situational context and adapt their functioning to the
extent to which a particular situation is detailed and speciﬁc (Gilligan 1982).
Dichotomy, separate and connected knowing seems too simple. It would seem to apply
rather easily to styles of interpersonal communication and engagement, empathy and lis-
tening to try and understand others, but not to faith and religion. Yet, women think also
critically, scientiﬁcally, objectively and men rely on interpersonal connections and
affective sensibility to deal with pertinent issues. This categorization simply seems ste-
reotypical. Also, conceptualization in terms of relationship and individuation seems not to
explain the differences between men and women. Individuals enter relationship, and the
more individuated the individuals are, the deeper the relationships are likely to be. All
approaches to God are some way relational, i.e. between two objects and individuation
make rather for deeper relationship, even with God. The observed associations between
Historical Relativism and anxiety seem to be too complex to be passed over with merely
suggestive labels. We just do not know what it exactly means, and it raises questions for
further explicitly focused research. And this all the more as Historical Relativism is the
least valid operationalization of Wulff’s (1991, 1999) theoretical construct. In his ﬁrst
PCBS scale, Hutsebaut (1996) failed to achieve two independent factors that measure
symbolic attitudes toward religion (Restorative Interpretation and Reductive Interpreta-
tion), aimed at corresponding to Wulff’s model. Instead, he obtained one factor as a
measure of symbolic interpretation of religion, which did not allow him to differentiate
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adaptation phase that the authors (Duriez et al. 2000) managed to divide Historical Rel-
ativism into two factors corresponding to Wulff’s model. In our research, we understood
Historical Relativism as a measure of symbolic interpretation of religion. However, this
interpretation should be treated with due caution, and it requires veriﬁcation by means of a
four-factor PCBS scale.
Conclusions
Several authors have searched for relations between religiosity and anxiety, in particular in
the context of analysis of the function of religiosity in the personality (Shreve-Neiger and
Edelstein 2004). A review of the empirical research on the relationships between religiosity
and psychic health (Gartner et al. 1991) as well as between religiosity and anxiety (Shreve-
Neiger and Edelstein 2004) reveals an inconsistency of the research results. Some of the
researchers suggest that there is no correlation between religiosity and anxiety (Fehr and
Heintzelman 1977; Frenz and Carey 1989; Francis and Jackson 2003; Huntley and Peeters
2005). Others show that there are signiﬁcant correlations between these variables. These
researchers also call for more research and analyses and point to the need for deﬁning both
variables, not in the categories of a single construct, but with regard to particular
dimensions of religiosity and to typological and structural elements of anxiety (Baker and
Gorsuch 1982; Harris et al. 2002; Shreve-Neiger and Edelstein 2004). This study supports
this attention to a multidimensional perspective of both religiosity and anxiety. Whereas
Orthodoxy was related to a stronger guilt proneness (O) and lower suspiciousness (L) in the
general sample, External Critique was related only to stronger suspiciousness (L) among
men. Historical Relativism correlated negatively with anxiety in the subgroup of women
but positively in the subgroup of men. Therefore, it seems that further exploration of the
‘‘established’’ relationship between religiousness and gender might be useful.
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